**PS 731**

**INTERNATIONAL SECURITY/CONFLICT ANALYSIS**

Fall 2016

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| Monday 1 – 3:30 PM | Patterson Office Tower-1645 |

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| Dr. Daniel S. Morey | 1631 Patterson Office Tower |
| Office hours: W 10 – 11 AM and 2 – 3 PM, F 10 – 11 AM, oba | daniel-morey@uky.edu |
| 257-4234 |  |

**Course Description**

This course examines theoretical and empirical work on the causes and consequences of militarized conflict between nation-states. We will consider causes from a variety of different levels of analysis and a variety of different theoretical perspectives. After taking this course, students should be familiar with the scientific literature on militarized conflict, should be able to evaluate this literature in a critical yet constructive fashion, and should be able to begin producing their own research in this area.

It should be noted that this will not be a history course; we will not be discussing or examining individual wars. The assigned readings emphasize generalizable theories and quantitative evidence on general patterns of conflict involvement across time and space, and this will be the focus of our discussions in this course.

This course is an important part of the Political Science Ph.D. program, and will thus be aimed at preparing Ph.D. students to pass their qualifying exams and to become serious scholars of conflict. Students from other departments or programs are welcome to take the course, as long as they can keep up with a course taught at this level. It must be emphasized that this course will involve intensive reading of advanced scholarly research; most readings involve formal mathematical models, quantitative data analysis, or both. While students are not necessarily expected to be able to produce their own quantitative and/or formal research, they must be able to understand and discuss it. Students who are unable to do this, should avoid this course.

**Text**

There is one recommended text for those who plan to specialize in international relations.

Dougherty, James E. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff. 2000. *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey* 5th ed. Longman Press. (optional)

All readings will be available on-line, either at the course Canvas page, JSTOR, or Scholar. In some rare cases students may have to go to the library to obtain a copy of a journal article. It is ALWAYS the student’s responsibility to obtain readings prior to class.

**Course Requirements**

All assignments must be completed to receive a passing grade in this course. Failure to complete any assignment will results in an automatic failing grade.

*Attendance and Participation 25%*

Because this is a graduate seminar, the instructor will not run class meetings as a lecture; all students are expected to come to each class meeting prepared to discuss the readings. This will involve spending the time to read each work on the reading list and thinking about what each reading contributes to the weekly topic. Class discussion every week will focus on such issues as the theoretical arguments being made (explicitly or implicitly), the empirical evidence that is marshaled to test these arguments, weaknesses or shortcomings of the work so far, and potential directions for future research. Note that coming to class late, or missing class without documentation of a very pressing concern, is completely unacceptable in a graduate seminar. For each absence 5 percentage points (100% - 5% = 95%) will be deducted from a student’s total course grade.

*In-Class Presentation of Additional Research 20%*

Because of the vast amount of empirical research on conflict, we will not be able to cover all of the important works for any single subject. To help expand the number of articles covered in the semester (and to overcome the collective action problem) each student will be responsible to review one additional article for the class every third week. Each student will provide the class with an approximately one page summary of the assigned article. They should be written from a research-oriented, academic perspective, rather than a literature review or a Siskel-and-Ebert-style review ("I liked/hated this article"), and should be constructive. Each paper should include a brief (one sentence) summary of the main argument of the paper, a brief review of the theory, discussion of the empirical tests and results, and a short summary of how the article fits into and expands the research topic. Students should also feel free to offer criticism of a work, as long as they can provide potential ways to solve/improve upon the article. Each student will present their findings briefly in class and answer questions.

*Article Reviews 15%*

In order to aid professional development, each student will complete TWO article reviews. The review is to be written as if you would submit it to a journal editor for the purpose of determining if an article should be published. Each review must include a decision regarding publication (Accept, Revise and Resubmit, or Reject). You should not assume that because something is already in print, that it deserves to be accepted. The subjects that can be covered in a review are wide open (theory, methods, data, writing, conclusions, etc); however, you should remember that the primary goal is to offer constructive criticism on an article, especially when you reject a piece. I will contact students by e-mail (just like in a real review situation) approximately 2 weeks prior to when a review is due with information regarding the article and journal you will be reviewing for (the journal you review for will not necessarily be the journal the article appeared in).

*Research Paper 40%*

The last requirement is an original research paper, involving the development and systematic testing of one or more hypotheses on the causes, management, or consequences of militarized *international* conflict. This paper may be quantitative or qualitative in nature, depending on the nature of the question and the student's methodological training, but in any case it must be analytical and theoretical in nature rather than descriptive. The final paper must be 20-30 pages in length, and should be comparable to an academic journal article in style. Please note that this must be an original paper for this course, and cannot overlap in any substantial way with a paper written for another course without my written consent.

A proposal for each student's paper topic must be submitted to the instructor for approval no later than **September 19th**. This proposal will involve a brief (2-3 pages) description of the paper topic, including a statement of what the student plans to study (the dependent variable), a suggestion of the basic theoretical logic and expectations (the independent variables), and a brief discussion of how he/she plans to study this topic (ideally including some preliminary notes about the data or other sources to be used). A research design (8-10 pages) must be turned in by **November 14th**, involving more detailed discussion of the paper's hypotheses, spatial-temporal domain, data sources, and similar topics; at this point the basic ideas of the paper should be finalized, with only the implementation and write-up remaining to be done. The completed paper is due **December 12th**, at which point each student will prepare a presentation on his or her paper for the class. This paper project will count for a total of 40% of the overall course grade, of which 5% each will be based on the initial proposal and the research design. The paper will be graded on the clarity and contribution of the theory as an addition to the literature on international conflict, as well as on the appropriateness of the analyses as a test of this theory. Students are also required to present their work to the department in the form of a poster presentation, we will arrange a time later in the class. Failure to present your research will result in a zero for the entire course.

**Grading Policy**

Final course grades will be assigned using the following scale:

A 100% - 90%

B 89.9% - 80%

C 79.9% - 70%

E 69.9% - 0%

**Plagiarism and Cheating**

Students are advised to retain all notes and drafts for all work until after they receive their final grade. Students should also be aware that the instructor takes matters of plagiarism and cheating very seriously and is prone to imposing the most severe penalty allowed by university rules, which includes, but is not limited to, issuing an automatic grade of 0.0 for the entire course.

**Special Needs**

If you have a documented disability that requires academic accommodations, please see me as soon as possible during scheduled office hours. In order to receive accommodations in this course, you must provide me with a **Letter of Accommodation** from the disability Resource Center (Room 2, Alumni Gym, 257-2754, jkarnes@email.uky.edu) for coordination of campus disability services available to students with disabilities.

**Classroom Expectations**

I expect all students to behave professionally in this class. If you miss a class you are still responsible for the information covered, the instructor will not provide you with their notes. I expect all students who attend class to arrive on time and ready to start class. It is disrespectful to the instructor and your classmates to show up late. During class please refrain from all disruptive behavior, including (but not limited to) reading newspapers, sleeping, talking during lecture, cell phone and pager use, using laptop computers for anything other than note taking, and insulting classmates or instructors. Note: You may NOT have any form of electronic communication device on your desk or within sight during exams.

**Course Schedule**

Below is a preliminary schedule of topics and readings for this course. The schedule is subject to change based on the pace of the class. The instructor will clearly announce any alterations to the course schedule (if any occur).

**August 29th - Course Introduction**

Diehl, Paul F. 2006. "Just a Phase?: Integrating Conflict Dynamics Over Time." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 23:199-210.

Regan, Patrick M. 2014. “Bringing Peace Back In: Presidential Address to the Peace Science Society, 2013. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 31 (4): 345-356.

**September 12th - Studying War, Defining War Theoretically and Empirically**

War in Theory

Von Clausewitz, Carl *On War*, Book 1 Chapter 1 [Course web page]

Vasquez, John A. 1993. “Conceptualizing War,” Chapter 1 from *The War Puzzle*. Pages 21-50. [Course web page]

Quincy Wright (1965). *A Study of War*. University of Chicago Press. [Course web page]

War Empirically and Trends Over Time

Jack S. Levy. 1988. "Analytic Problems in the Identification of Wars." International Interactions, 14 (2): 181-186. [Course web page]

Small, Melvin and J. David Singer. 1982. *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. Chapters 1 and 2 [Course web page].

Sarkees, Meredith, Frank Wayman, and J. David Singer, “Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution Over Time, 1816-1997” *International Studies Quarterly* 47, 1 (2003): 49-70.

Faten Ghosn, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer (2004). “The MID3 Data Set, 1993- 2001:

Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21, 2: 133-154.

Themner, Lotta and Peter Wallensteen. 2013. “Armed Conflict, 1946-2012.” *Journal of Peace Research* 50 (4): 509-521.

Hensel, Paul R. 2002. "The More Things Change...: Recognizing and Responding to Trends in Armed Conflict." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 19 (1): 27-52.

\*\*Interested students should also see the form pieces on the Decline of War in *International Studies Review* (2013) vol. 15, pages 396-419.

Additional Books: Compilations of Wars and Other Conflicts

* Ewan Anderson (2000). *Global Geopolitical Flashpoints: An Atlas of Conflict.* London: Stationery Office.
* Jacob Bercovitch (1997). *International Conflict: A Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and Their Management*, 1945-1995. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
* Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997. See also their online updates to the case histories, the ICB Data Viewer: <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/dataviewer/>
* James Ciment (1999). *Encyclopedia of Conflicts since World War II*. Armonk, NY: Sharpe

Reference.

* George Kohn (1999). *Dictionary of Wars*. New York: Facts on File.
* David Munro and Alan J. Day (1999). *A World Record of Major Conflict Areas*. London: Edward Arnold.
* Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman. 2009. *Resort to War: 1816 – 2007*. CQ Press.

**September 19th - Polarity**

Kenneth N. Waltz (1964). "The Stability of a Bipolar World." *Daedalus* 93 (Summer): 881-909. [Course web page]

Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer (1964). "Multipolar Systems and International Stability." *World Politics*, 16: 390-406.

Wohlforth, William C. 1999. "The Stability of a Unipolar World." *International Security*, 24(1): 5-41.

Wayman, Frank (1984). "Bipolarity and War." *Journal of Peace Research* 21: 61-78.

Mansfield, Edward. 1992. “The Concentration of Capabilities and the Onset of War.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36: 3-24.

Kadera, Kelly M., Mark J. C. Crescenzi and Megan L. Shannon. 2003. “Democratic Survival, Peace, and War in the International System.” *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (2): 234-247

Additional Readings

Nuno P. Monterio. 2011/12. “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful.” *International Security* 36 (3): 9-40.

Wohlforth, William. 2009. “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War.” World Politics, 61 (1): 28-57.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1978). "Systemic Polarization and the Occurrence and Duration of

War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 22(2): 241-267.

Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson. 2010. “Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally Against the Leading Global Power?” *International Security* 35 (1): 7-43.

Bear Braumoeller (2008). "Systemic Politics and the Origins of Great Power Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 102, 1: 77-93.

Frank Whelon Wayman and T. Clifton Morgan (1990). "Measuring Polarity in the International

System" In J. David Singer and Paul F. Diehl (eds.), *Measuring the Correlates of War*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

James Lee Ray (1990). “The Measurement of System Structure.” In J. David Singer and Paul F.

Diehl, (eds.) *Measuring the Correlates of War*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 99-114.

Patrick James (1995). “Structural Realism and the Causes of War.” *Mershon International Studies Review* 39 2: 181-208.

Kenneth N. Waltz (2000). “Structural Realism after the Cold War.” *International Security* 25 1:

5-41.

Morton, Jeffrey S., and Harvey Starr. 2001. “Uncertainty, Change, and War: Power Fluctuations

and War in the Modern Elite Power System.” *Journal of Peace Research* 38/1 (January): 49-66.

Additional Books

Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. *Theory of International Politics.* New York: McGraw-Hill.

Mansfield, Edward D. 1994. *Power, Trade, and War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

Domke, William. 1988. *War and the Changing Global System*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

**September 26th - Balance of Power and Power Transition**

Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations*, Chapters 11 and 12 [Course web page]

A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler (1980). *The War Ledger*, Chapter 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 13-62. [Course web page]

Lemke, Douglas and Suzanne Werner. 1996. “Power Parity, Commitment to Change, and War.” *International Studies Quarterly* 40: 235-260.

Kadera, Kelly M. 2001. *The Power-Conflict Story: A Dynamic Model of Interstate Rivalry.*

Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Chapters 3 and 4. [Course web page]. **\*\*This is a challenging work – leave extra time.**

Additional Readings

Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons (1980). “War and the Cycle of Relative Power.” *American*

*Political Science Review* 74, 4: 947-965.

Erich Weede (1976). "Overwhelming Preponderance as a Pacifying Condition Among Contiguous Asian Dyads, 1950-1969." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 20 (3): 395-412.

Houweling, Henk and Jan Siccama. 1991. “Power Transitions and Critical Points as Predictors of

Great Power War.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 35: 642-658.

William Moul (2003). “Power Parity, Preponderance, and War between Great Powers.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, 4 (August): 468-489.

Woosang Kim (1991). "Alliance Transitions and Great Power War." *American Journal of Political Science* 35: 833-850.

Woosang Kim and James D. Morrow (1992). "When Do Power Shifts Lead to War?" *American*

*Journal of Political Science* 36:896-922.

See Also

Jonathan M. DiCicco and Jack S. Levy (1999). "Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution

of the Power Transition Research Program." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43 (6): 675-704.

Kugler, Jacek and Douglas Lemke 2000. "The Power Transition Research Program: Assessing

Theoretical and Empirical Advances." In Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies II*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, pp. 129-163.

**October 3th - Rivalry**

Goertz, Gary and Paul F. Diehl. 1993. "Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns." *International Studies Quarterly*, 37(2): 147-171.

Colaresi, Michael P., Karen Rasler, and William R. Thompson. 2007. *Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space, and Conflict Escalation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 and 2 [Blackboard]

Sara Mitchell and Cameron Thies. 2011. “Issue Rivalries.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28 (3): 230-260.

Goertz, Gary and Paul F. Diehl. 1995. "The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries: The Impact of Political Shocks." *American Journal of Political Science*, 39(1): 30-52.

Paul R. Hensel (1999). “An Evolutionary Approach to the Study of Interstate Rivalry.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 17, 2 (Fall): 179-206.

Morey, Daniel S. 2011. “When War Brings Peace: A Dynamic Model of the Rivalry Process.” American Journal of Political Science 55 (2): 263-275.

Additional Readings

James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl (2006). "The New Rivalry Dataset: Procedures and Patterns." *Journal of Peace Research* 43, 3: 331-348.

Colaresi, Michael and William R. Thompson. 2002. “Strategic Rivalries, Protracted Conflict, and Crisis Escalation.” *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (3): 263-287.

Vasquez, John A. “Distiguishing Rivals that Go to War from Those that Do Not: A Quantitative Comparative Case Study of Two Paths to War.” *International Studies Quarterly* 40 (4): 531-558.

Gartke, Erik and Michael W. Simon. 1999. “Hot Hand: A Critical Analysis of Enduring Rivalries.” *Journal of Politics* 61 (3): 777-798.

See also the reply by Colaresi and Thompson in same edition.

Lemke, Douglas and William Reed. 2001. “War and Rivalry Among Great Powers.” *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (2): 457-469D. Scott Bennett. 1997. “Measuring Rivalry Termination, 1816-1992.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41 2: 227-254.

D. Scott Bennett. 1998. "Integrating and Testing Models of Rivalry Termination." *American*

*Journal of Political Science* 42: 1200-1232.

Additional Books

Diehl, Paul F. and Gary Goertz. 2000. *War and Peace in International Rivalry*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Maoz, Zeev and Ben D. Mor. 2002. Bound by Struggle: The Strategic Evolution of Enduring Rivalries. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Colaresi, Michael. 2005. Scare Tactics: The Politics of International Rivalry. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

**October 10th -** **Arms Races**

Michael D. Wallace (1979). "Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence." *Journal of*

*Conflict Resolution* 23, 1: 3-16.

Paul F. Diehl (1983). "Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look." *Journal of Peace Research* 20: 205-210.

James D. Morrow (1989). "A Twist of Truth: A Reexamination of the Effects of Arms Races on the Occurrence of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33, 3: 500-529.

Paul F. Diehl and Jean Kingston (1987). "Messenger or Message? Military Buildups and the

Initiation of Conflict." *Journal of Politics* 49, 4: 789-799.

Toby J. Rider, Michael G. Findley, and Paul F. Diehl (2011). "Just Part of the Game? Arms Races, Rivalry, and War." *Journal of Peace Research* 48, 1: 85-100.

Toby J. Rider (2013). “Uncertainty, Salient Stakes, and the Cause of Conventional Arms Races.” *International Studies Quarterly* 57: 580-591.

Additional Readings

Paul F. Diehl and Mark J. C. Crescenzi (1998). "Reconfiguring the Arms Race-War Debate."

*Journal of Peace Research* 35, 1: 111-118.

Douglas M. Gibler, Toby J. Rider, and Marc L. Hutchison (2005). "Taking Arms Against a Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races During Periods of Rivalry." *Journal of Peace Research* 42, 2: 131-147.

Kinsella, David and Herbert K. Tillema. 1995. "Arms and Aggression in the Middle East: Overt Military Interventions, 1948-1991." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 39(2): 306-329.

Andrew Kydd (2000). "Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the Hawk Perspective."

*American Journal of Political Science* 44 (2): 228-244.

Sample, Susan G. 1997. "Arms Races and Dispute Escalation: Resolving the Debate." *Journal of*

*Peace Research*, 34(1): 7-22.

Susan G. Sample. 1998. "Military Buildups, War, and Realpolitik: A Multivariate Model."

*Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (2): 156-175.

Susan Sample. 2002. “The Outcomes of Military Buildups: Minor States vs. Major Powers” *Journal of Peace Research*, 39 (6): 669-691.

Additional Books

Hammond, Grant. 1993. *Plowshares Into Swords: Arms Races and International Politics,*

*1840-1991.* Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

**October 17th - Alliances**

Leeds, Brett Ashley, Andrew G. Long, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. 2000. “Reevaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44(5): 686-699.

Christensen, Thomas J. and Jack Snyder. 1990. “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity.” *International Organization* 44: 137-169.

Brett V. Benson, Patrick R. Bentley, and James Lee Ray. 2013. “Ally Provocateur: Why Allies Do Not Always Behave.” *Journal of Peace Research* 50 (1): 47-58.

Douglas M. Gibler and John A. Vasquez. 1998. “Uncovering the Dangerous Alliances, 1495-1980.” *International Studies Quarterly* 42 (4): 785-807.

Brett Ashley Leeds. 2003. “Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes” *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (3): 427-439.

Jesse C. Johnson and Brett Ashley Leeds. 2010. “Defense Pacts: A Prescription for Peace?” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 7 (1): 45-65.

Mattes, Michaela and Greg Vonnahme. 2010. “Contracting for Peace: Do Nonaggression Pacts Reduce Conflict?” *Journal of Politics* 72 (4): 925-938.

Additional Readings

Oren, Ido. 1990. “The War Proneness of Alliances.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34: 208-233.

Kegley, Charles and Gregory A. Raymond. 1982. “Alliance Norms and War.” *International Studies Quarterly* 26: 572-595.

Siverson, Randolph and Michael Tennefoss. 1984. “Power, Alliance, and the Escalation of International Conflict, 1815-1965.” *American Political Science Review* 78 (4): 1057-1069.

Kim, Woosang. 1989. “Power, Alliance, and Major War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 33: 255-273.

Jack Levy. 1981. “Alliance Formation and War Behavior: An Analysis of the Great Powers, 1495-1975.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25: 581-613.

Randolph M. Siverson and Joel King. 1980. “Attributes of National Alliance Membership and War Participation, 1815-1965.” *American Journal of Political Science* 24 (1): 1-15.

**October 24th - Rational Choice Approaches**

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. 1988. "The Contribution of Expected Utility Theory to the Study of

International Conflict." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18: 629-652.

D. Scott Bennett and Allan Stam. 2000. “A Universal Test of an Expected Utility Theory of War.” *International Studies Quarterly* 44, 3: 451-480.

James D. Fearon. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization*, 49:

379-414.

Robert Powell. 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem." *International Organization* 60 1:

169-203.

Dan Reiter. 2003. “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War.” *Perspectives on Politics* 1/1

(March): 27-43.

Branislav L. Slantchev. 2003. “The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States.” *The American Political Science Review*, 97 (1): 123-133.

Additional Readings

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman. 1986. "Reason and War." *American Political*

*Science Review* 80, 4: 1113-1150.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 2004. "Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War." *World Politics* 56, 3: 363-388.

Joe Eyerman and Robert A. Hart. 1996. "An Empirical Test of the Audience Cost Proposition:

Democracy Speaks Louder than Words." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, 4: 597-616.

James D. Fearon. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." *International Organization* 52, 2 (Spring), 269-306.

James D. Fearon. 1997. "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, 1 (February), 68-90.

Additional Books

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman. 1992. *War and Reason*. New Haven: Yale

University Press.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. 2003.

*The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Dan Reiter. 2009. *How Wars End.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

**October 31th – Domestic Politics**

Richard J. Stoll. 1984. "The Guns of November: Presidential Reelections and the Use of Force, 1947-1982." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28, 2: 231-246.

James Meernik and Peter Waterman. 1996. "The Myth of the Diversionary Use of Force by American Presidents." Political Research Quarterly 49, 3: 573-590.

Philip B. K. Potter. 2013. “Electoral Margins and American Foreign Policy.” *International Studies Quarterly* 57: 505-518.

Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Brandon C. Prins (2004). "Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48: 937 - 961.

Laron K. Williams. 2013. “Flexible Election timing and International Conflict.” *International Studies Quarterly* 57: 449-461.

Emizet F. Kisangani and Jeffery Pickering. 2011. “Democratic Accountability and Diversionary Force: Regime Types and the Use of Benevolent and Hostile Military Force.” *Journal of*

*Conflict Resolution* 55 (6): 1021-1046.

Additional Readings

Baum, Matthew A. 2002. “The Constituent Foundations of the Rally-Round-The-Flag

Phenomenon.” *International Studies Quarterly* 46/2 (June): 263-298.

Brett Ashley Leeds and David R. Davis. 1997. "Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, 6: 814-834.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 2002. “Domestic Politics and International Relations.” *International*

*Studies Quarterly* 46/1 (March) 1-9.

Fordham, Benjamin. 1998. "Partisanship, Macroeconomic Policy, and U.S. Uses of Force,

1949-1994." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(4): 418-439.

Fordham, Benjamin. 1998. "The Politics of Threat Perception and the Use of Force: A Political

Economy Model of U.S. Uses of Force, 1949-1994." *International Studies Quarterly*, 42(3): 567-590.

Fordham, Benjamin O. 2002. “Another Look at “Parties, Voters, and the Use of Force Abroad.”

*Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46/4 (August): 572-593.

T. Clifton Morgan and Christopher J. Anderson. 1999. "Domestic Support and Diversionary External Conflict in Great Britain, 1950-1992." *Journal of Politics* 61, 3: 799-814.

Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Will H. Moore. 2002. “Presidential Use of Force During the Cold War: Aggregation, Truncation, and Temporal Dynamics.” *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (2): 438-452.

**November 7th –International Institutions and Trade**

**\*\*Since most of you will take the IO course I focus on trade in this section.**

Katherine Barbieri (1996). “Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate

Conflict?” *Journal of Peace Research* 33: 29-49.

Erik Gartzke, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer (2001). “Economic Interdependence and

International Conflict.” *International Organization* 55, 2 (Spring): 391-437.

Yonatan Lupu and Vincent A. Traag. 2012. “Trading Communities, the Networked Structure of International Relations, and the Kantain Peace.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57 (6): 1011-1042.

Long, Andrew. 2008. “Bilateral Trade in the Shadow of Armed Conflict.” *International Studies Quarterly* 52 (1): 81-101.

Crescenzi, Mark J. C., 2003. “Economic Exit, Interdependence, and Conflict.” *Journal of Politics* 65(3): 809–832.

Katja Kleinberg and Benjamin Fordham. 2013. “The Domestic Politics of Trade and Conflict.” *International Studies Quarterly* 57: 605-619.

Schneider, Gerald. 2014. “Peace through Globalization and Capitalism? Prospects of two Liberal Propositions.” *Journal of Peace Research* 51 (2): 173-183.

Additional Readings

John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett (1999). “The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of

Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992.” *World Politics* 52: 1-37.

Erik Gartzke (2007). "The Capitalist Peace." *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (1): 166–

191.

Michael Mousseau (2000). “Market Prosperity, Democratic Consolidation, and Democratic

Peace.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, 4: 472-507.

Shannon, Megan L. 2009. “Preventing War and Providing the Peace? International Organizations and the Management of Territorial Disputes.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*.

Boehmer, Charles, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom. 2004. “Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace?” *World Politics* 57 (1): 1-38.

Jon Pevehouse and Bruce Russett (2006). "Democratic International Governmental Organizations Promote Peace." *International Organization* 60, 4 (October): 969-1000.

**November 14th - Geography and Territory**

Toft, Monica Duffy. 2014. “Territory and War.” Journal of Peace Research 51 (2): 185-198.

Nils Petter Gleditsch. 1995. “Geography, Democracy, and Peace.” *International Interactions* 20 (4): 297-323.

John Vasquez. 1995. “Why Do Neighbors Fight? Territoriality, Proximity, or Interaction.” *Journal of Peace Research* 32: 277-293,

Paul R. Hensel, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Thomas E. Sowers II, and Clayton L. Thyne. 2008.

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